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Executive dysfunctions, psychopathologies arising from problems in the control and
regulation of behavior, can occur as a result of the faulty execution of formal information
processing models or as a result of malfunctioning neural mechanisms. The models
correspond to the formal descriptions of how signals in the environment must be
transformed in order to behave adaptively, and the mechanisms correspond to the signal
transformations that nervous systems implement in order to execute those cognitive
functions. Mechanisms in the form of repeated patterns of neural dynamics execute
information processing models. Two distinct modes of malfunction can occur when
neural dynamics execute models of information processing. The processing models
describing behavior may fail to be executed correctly by neural mechanisms. Or,
the neural mechanisms may malfunction, failing to implement the right computation.
As an example of malfunctioning models in executive cognition, purported failures
of rule following can be understood as failures to appropriately execute a suite of
processingmodels. As an example of malfunctioningmechanisms of executive cognition,
maladaptive behavior resulting from dysfunction in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
can be understood as failures in the signal transformations carried out therein. The
purpose of these examples is to illustrate the potential benefits of considering models and
mechanisms in the diagnosis and etiology of neuropsychological illness and dysfunction,
especially disorders of executive cognition.
Keywords: decision-making, computational psychiatry, neuropsychology, executive function, wisconsin card
sorting test, Iowa Gambling Task, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
INTRODUCTION
In 1967, a subway train tragically struck Vladimir, a Muscovite engineering student, resulting in the
resection of his frontal poles (Goldberg, 2001). Vladimir exhibited a range of deficits in complex
behavior. When instructed to repeat a story, he was unable to recapitulate the correct narrative, as
well as being unable to stop the rambling, incoherent narrative he did produce. When instructed to
draw a circle, he drew multiple; when instructed to draw a cross, a circle, and a square in sequence,
the cross appeared in all three shapes; when instructed to draw a circle, a cross, and a circle in
sequence, Vladimir drew a donut last, persevering in drawing two lines as he had done for the
cross. The annals of neurology are replete with examples of deficits in complex behavior such as
Vladimir’s.
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Tempting though it may be to describe Vladimir as
inappropriately persisting in following a rule, the accurate
description and diagnosis of his dysfunctional psychology is
an open scientific question. Understanding the information
processing models and dynamical mechanisms of cognition
is critical to understanding and diagnosing mental illness,
including maladaptive perseverative behavior like Vladimir’s.
Here we discuss how models and mechanisms can provide
new insight into psychiatric nosology. In particular, psychiatric
pathology results from misexecution of processing models by
dynamical mechanisms in the brain. We illustrate this approach
by examining how a model-based view interprets pathology
evident in rule-following tasks and how a mechanism-based view
interprets pathology evident in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
dysfunction.
The models describe how signals in the environment
must be transformed in order to behave adaptively, and the
mechanisms describe the dynamics of neural circuits that
execute those cognitive functions (Marr, 1982; Adams et al.,
2012). Neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers, and others
who study the mind invoke formal, mathematical models of
behavior to characterize cognitive functions. These models are
mathematical formulae that contain variables, picking out which
properties of the environment the system must track, and the
mathematical relations between those variables, how they must
be transformed, for adaptive behavior. For example, in the case
of simple decisions, such as deciding between different size
rewards or deciding when to leave a depleting resource, the
models can be drawn from economic models of maximization
of value (Bernoulli, 1738; Platt and Glimcher, 1999) or from
optimal foraging theory (Charnov, 1976; Stephens and Krebs,
1986). The dynamics of the neural mechanisms, the neurons or
neural circuits, execute these processingmodels by implementing
neural computations over signals (Herz et al., 2006; Adams
et al., 2012; Carandini and Heeger, 2012). These circuits
implement these computations by transforming afferent signals
they receive into efferent signals passed on to later processing
areas. One example is the integrate-to-bound dynamical system,
a neurocomputation for integrating noisy perceptual evidence
during decision-making (Gold and Shadlen, 2001, 2007; Roitman
and Shadlen, 2002) as well as potentially playing a role in strategic
decisions to depart depleting resources (Hayden et al., 2011).
Another example is divisive normalization, a neurocomputation
involved in such diverse cognitive functions as attention
(Reynolds and Heeger, 2009), value encoding (Louie et al.,
2011), multisensory integration (Ohshiro et al., 2011), and others.
The discovery that neural mechanisms repeatedly use a discrete
number of neurocomputations, concatenated and combined to
execute processing models, is a hallmark of recent advances in
understanding the neural basis of cognition. In sum, information
processing models are executed by the computational dynamics
of neural circuits.
Two distinct modes of malfunction can occur when circuit
dynamics execute models of information processing. The
processing models describing behavior may fail to be executed
correctly by neural mechanisms, without the physiological
mechanism itself malfunctioning. Or, the neural mechanisms
may malfunction, thereby failing to implement the right
computation. To illustrate this view, we will assess two
examples of psychiatric deficits, one each from a model and
a mechanism malfunction. As an example of malfunctioning
models, purported failures of rule following can be understood
as failures to appropriately execute a suite of processing models.
As an example of malfunctioning mechanisms, maladaptive
behavior resulting from dysfunction in the mPFC can be
understood as failures in the signal transformations carried out
therein. The purpose of these examples is not to be definitive but
rather descriptive, to illustrate our approach to neuropsychiatric
nosology and the potential benefits it holds for the diagnosis and
etiology of neuropsychiatric illness and dysfunction.
MODEL-BASED DYSFUNCTION: FAILURES
TO FOLLOW RULES
A fundamental executive function in cognitive systems is the
ability to follow rules. Two prominent clinical assessments of
rule-following are the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara, 2007)
and the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST) (Milner, 1963).
Both tasks have been proposed to assess the ability of patients
to appropriately incorporate information to augment future
behavior (“rule following”). We contend that these tasks probe
many cognitive functions at once, thus failing to probe a unique
cognitive function, due to each task enlisting multiple cognitive
functions for successful performance.
The IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, 2007) is a risk-based
gambling task. Subjects are given an initial sum of money and
attempt to maximize their profit by selecting cards from one of
four decks. The different decks pay out randomly, with some
decks advantageous over the long term, resulting in a net gain,
and others not, resulting in a net loss. The IGT is utilized to assess
cognitive function in patients with focal brain lesions, as well as
a number of psychiatric illnesses (Bechara, 2007). Patients with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions exhibit more
disadvantageous deck choices (Anderson et al., 1999) and though
they exhibit appropriate physiological responses to outcomes on
the task, these patients show no anticipatory affective autonomic
response prior to selecting from the risky decks (Bechara et al.,
1996, 1999). There is also a laterality effect, where right vmPFC
damage results in impairment and left vmPFC damage does
not, hypothesized to be connected to the association of right
hemispheric activity with affective processing (Tranel et al.,
2002; Clark et al., 2003; Buelow and Suhr, 2009). Some studies
find that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) damage results in deficient choices
compared to controls (Manes et al., 2002; Fellows and Farah,
2005), while others fail to find such deficits in dlPFC lesioned
patients (Bechara et al., 1998; Bechara and Damasio, 2002;
Bechara, 2003; Fellows, 2004). Patients with amygdalar lesions
show a deficit in IGT performance (Bechara et al., 1999; Brand
et al., 2007a,b), though such patients exhibit general physiological
deficits. Adding to this confusion, neuroimaging studies of
healthy controls implicate medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC)
in mediating IGT performance (Ernst et al., 2002; Bolla et al.,
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2003; Tucker et al., 2004; Windmann et al., 2006) (for review, see
Buelow and Suhr, 2009).
Although there has been criticism of the IGT in the past
(Buelow and Suhr, 2009; Gansler et al., 2011a,b), the IGT is
a perfect illustration of the shortcomings of focusing on gross
anatomical and behavioral deficit. What formal processing must
the patient’s brain execute in order to behave optimally on
the task? Patients must track the values of each of the decks.
Tracking this value requires risk encoding, encoding of the
variance of rewards relative to the mean reward (Weber et al.,
2004; McCoy and Platt, 2005). Risk and value computations
potentially explain themOFC activation present in neuroimaging
during the IGT, as the mOFC encodes the value of options in
the environment and mediates reward-guided decision making
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Noonan et al., 2010; Walton
et al., 2010; Watson and Platt, 2012). In addition to value
and risk, optimal performance on the IGT requires tracking
reward rates over time, a fundamental capacity of organisms
that is aptly captured by optimal foraging theory (Stephens
and Krebs, 1986). Dopaminergic signals originating in the
basal ganglia (BG) play a fundamental role in reward signaling
(Schultz et al., 1997, 1998), subjects with dopaminergic disorders
such as Parkinson’s patients show deficits in foraging behavior
(Rutledge et al., 2009), and dopaminergic pathways originating
in the BG innervate the PFC (Williams and Goldman-Rakic,
1993; Björklund and Dunnett, 2007). Disorders evident in IGT
behavior may result from a failure to execute the computations
described by foraging models, particularly resulting from
deficits in the targets of dopaminergic projections to prefrontal
areas. Risk assessment, expected value computations, reward
intake rates, and presumably other cognitive processes are
implicated in successful IGT performance. Thus, the IGT
assesses behavior in a fashion that combines multiple cognitive
functions.
Analyzing evidence from the WCST suggests a similar
conclusion. Utilized in the assessment of frontal lobe
dysfunction, the WCST requires the subject to match a sample
card with one of four key cards along one of three dimensions:
color, number and shape (Grant and Berg, 1948; Milner, 1963;
Heaton, 1981, 1993). The subject is not informed of the matching
rule, but receives feedback after each sample card about whether
the categorization was correct. After 10 consecutive correct
matches, an unsignaled change in the active matching rule
occurs, and the subject has to explore to determine the new rule.
The subject’s performance can be analyzed along a number of
dimensions, including the number of completed rule switches,
number of perseverative errors (sticking with an old rule after a
switch), and number of non-perseverative errors (switching from
a correct rule) (Nyhus and Barceló, 2009). A number of brain
regions have been implicated in successful WCST performance.
Milner’s original 1963 study found more perseverative errors
for dlPFC lesioned patients than those with OFC, temporal,
or parietal lesions (Milner, 1963). The relative importance of
frontal cortex for WCST has since been corroborated by a large
number of studies (see Nyhus and Barceló, 2009 for recent
review). However, damage to temporal (Hermann et al., 1988;
Corcoran and Upton, 1993; Strauss et al., 1993; Horner et al.,
1996; Giovagnoli, 2001), subcortical (Mukhopadhyay et al.,
2007), hippocampal (Corcoran and Upton, 1993; Giovagnoli,
2001; Igarashi et al., 2002), and cerebellar (Mukhopadhyay
et al., 2007) regions impairs WCST performance. Neuroimaging
studies of patients or normal controls have linked increased
activation of the dlPFC (Kawasaki et al., 1993; Marenco et al.,
1993; Berman et al., 1995; Nagahama et al., 1996, 1997; Volz
et al., 1997; Mentzel et al., 1998; Nagahama et al., 1998; Ragland
et al., 1998; Lombardi et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 2000; Monchi
et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2001; González-Hernández et al., 2002;
Lie et al., 2006) and vlPFC (Monchi et al., 2001; Lie et al., 2006),
among other, non-frontal areas (Nyhus and Barceló, 2009), to
successful behavior on the task.
The breadth and number of regions activated suggests that
the WCST requires a number of different cognitive functions for
successful performance. For example, “set-shifting,” the ability
to switch between active rules, is often invoked as one of the
main functions probed by the WCST and disturbed in patient
populations that exhibit WCST deficits (Barceló et al., 1997;
Rubinstein et al., 2001; Monsell, 2003; Braver et al., 2006; Shallice,
2006; Nyhus and Barceló, 2009). The notion of set-shifting as
switching between encoded rules may be an outdated legacy
of the classical approach to theorizing about how rules are
executed (Haugeland, 1985). Instead, as with the IGT, optimal
performance on the task may be driven by cognitive foraging
mechanisms as subjects search through an abstract space of
possible patterns of behavior to determine the adaptive response
(Hills et al., 2008), which requires keeping track of reward rates
or constructing and updating models of the environment. In
particular, upon a decrease in the local reward rate, the system
may be forced into an exploratory regime where it attempts to
determine the current rule. Individuals with nonspecific brain
injury have been shown to exhibit deficits on the WCST and
a foraging task, exhibiting a preference for local reward rates
(Schlund, 2002), indicating the potential benefits of viewing
aberrant WCST behavior through the lens of formal foraging
theory. Similar lessons may be gleaned by reconceptualizing
how errors on the WCST are classified and analyzed. Non-
perseverative errors have been criticized in the past as conflating
two types of error, called efficient (appropriately exploring
for a new rule) and random (inappropriately switching rules)
errors (Barceló and Knight, 2002). Perhaps, however, the neural
mechanisms underlying WCST performance evolved to support
exploratory search, where changes in behavior permit exploration
for and potential exploitation of new resources. If so, both types
of error are forms of exploratory behavior owing to foraging
through possible behavioral patterns in order to optimize reward
rates. Likewise, perseverative errors, associated with dlPFC
lesions (Rogers, 1998; Shallice, 2006), may not result from failures
to disengage from previously activated rules, but failures to
appropriately assess reward rates or failures to integrate local
reward rates with information about the environment, both
resulting in failures to forage in the space of possible actions
to maximize reward. Much like the IGT, the WCST assesses
cognitive function in a fashion that may in fact cut orthogonally
across multiple different cognitive computations needed for
successful performance on the task.
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MECHANISM-BASED DYSFUNCTION:
MALFUNCTION IN THE MEDIAL
PREFRONTAL CORTEX
The mPFC consists of a group of cortical structures in the
anterior end of the brain and includes the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), the dmPFC, and the vmPFC, as well as other areas.
The mPFC has been implicated in social cognition (Amodio
and Frith, 2006), default mode activity (Buckner et al., 2008),
cognitive control (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), affective processing
(Etkin et al., 2011), and other processes. Here we focus on the
ACC and its role in implementing the mechanisms that subserve
information processing in cognitive control and social cognition.
Recent research has revealed a stereotyped signal
transformation in the ACC sulcus (ACCs) exhibiting
integrate-to-bound dynamics and that may be instructive
for psychiatric pathologies like obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD). Integrate-to-bound dynamics in neuronal mechanisms
implement a basic exponentiation function that starts at a
baseline, integrates some incoming signal until reaching a
threshold, and then resets (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wang,
2002). This basic circuit has been implicated in a diverse array of
functions from eye movement control (Andersen, 1989; Seung,
1996, 2003) to perceptual decision-making across modalities
(Hernandez et al., 2002; Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Uchida
and Mainen, 2003; Uka and DeAngelis, 2003, 2006; Heekeren
et al., 2004; Romo et al., 2004; Kepecs et al., 2006; Uchida et al.,
2006). Recently Hayden and colleagues unveiled in ACC a novel
implementation of the integrate-to-bound circuit over longer
timescales for strategic decisions (Hayden et al., 2011). Monkeys
participated in a simulated foraging task, deciding when to
leave a steadily decreasing reward source to forage at another,
with leave decisions penalized by a timeout, simulating travel
to a new rewarding location. As monkeys neared a decision
to leave, neurons in the dorsal and ventral banks of the ACCs
exhibited a pattern of successively higher peaks of activation,
with this activity thresholding on leave decisions (Hayden
et al., 2011). This activation pattern, observed in the past for
sequences of movements (Shidara and Richmond, 2002), is
highly suggestive of an exponential signal transformation by the
integrate-to-bound dynamics in ACCs neurons.
The regularity of the activation function of neurons in this
area has implications for the role of ACC in neuropsychiatric
dysfunction, as illustrated by the case of OCD. OCD has a
well-characterized clinical pathology, affecting up to 3% of
the population and resulting in anxiogenic intrusive thoughts
(obsessions) and repetitive aversive actions (compulsions)
(Graybiel and Rauch, 2000; Maia et al., 2008; Menzies et al.,
2008; Nenadic, 2008; Greenberg et al., 2010). The aberrant
neurobiological circuitry in OCD patients includes the head
of the caudate (Guehl et al., 2008; Maia et al., 2008) and
orbitofrontal cortices (Maia et al., 2008; Menzies et al., 2008), as
well as the anterior cingulate (Saxena et al., 1998; Cosgrove and
Rauch, 2003; Maia et al., 2008). All three areas show hyperactivity
in functional neuroimaging at rest (Szeszko et al., 2008),
increased activation with OCD symptom provocation (Saxena
et al., 1998), and resolution of resting state hyperactivity with
successful therapy (Maia et al., 2008). The ACC specifically shows
elevated levels of baseline activity in OCD (Rauch et al., 1994,
2001; Adler et al., 2000) and hyperactivation during cognitive
activity such as during the processing of errors (Fitzgerald
et al., 2005) or during incongruent trials in a conflict task
(Fitzgerald et al., 2005, 2010; Maltby et al., 2005; Page et al., 2009).
Cingulotomy, which resects both banks of the ACCs and the
ACC gyrus (ACCg), is effective as treatment for refractory OCD
(Graybiel and Rauch, 2000; Cosgrove and Rauch, 2003; Kim et al.,
2003; Greenberg et al., 2010; Dougherty and Greenberg, 2011).
What role in the dysfunctional signal processing in OCD does
the ACC play? ACC multiplexes information about rewards and
actions (Hayden and Platt, 2010), and lesions in monkeys to the
ACCs result in difficulty in reward-guided changes in behavior
(Kennerley et al., 2006). Removal of both ACCs and ACCg results
in higher error rates in a reward harvesting task (Rushworth
et al., 2003). In humans, single neuron activity in ACCs in
OCD patients has been shown to signal trials where different
possible responses interfere as well as elevated activity following
these interference trials, and the concomitant behavioral slowing
following an interference trial was abolished post-ACC resection
(Sheth et al., 2012). But the mechanism approach reveals deeper
insight into the signal transformations that are central to the
function of the ACC.
As the ACCs signals changes in behavioral strategy or
sequence, a deviant signal transform in the form of persistent
transient activation that thresholds abnormally may result in
both an inability to change an action plan—compulsions—as
well as the hypermetabolism observed in the ACC in OCD
patients. The dysfunction in ACCs can be helpfully analyzed
using dynamical systems theory. In dynamical systems theory, a
system is conceptualized as inhabiting a point in its state space,
the space of all possible states of the system. As the system evolves
over time, it occupies a succession of such states in its state space,
tracing out a trajectory of such states. Some states in the state
space will attract the system; these are known as attractors, and
the states around the attractor that typically lead to the system
occupying that state are known as the basin of attraction for that
attractor. OCD symptoms could reflect an inability of the circuit
to leave a basin of attraction resulting in a repeated pattern of
activation that does not threshold as normal. This hypothesis is
supported by modeling of OCD with dynamical systems, which
suggests that attractor basins in the network are abnormally deep,
compelling the system to stay in a particular basin, possibly
due to either excitatory glutamatergic hyperactivity (Rolls et al.,
2008) or decreased inhibition (Maia and McClelland, 2012).
As the system’s signal transforms become trapped in a pattern
of repeated, non-increasing transient activations, the behavioral
output likewise becomes trapped in a pattern of repeated actions,
the compulsions that are a hallmark of OCD.
Knowledge of the neural dynamics in a particular brain
region connects metabolic evidence with the computations
being executed in a region for tailored interventions. Granted
knowledge of the dynamics implemented by an anatomical
circuit, its hypo- or hyper-activity can be correlated with aspects
of the signal transformation being performed by the circuit
that might be malfunctioning in a particular disorder. The
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circuit mechanism approach allows us to characterize the ways
that local circuits transform signals such that intervention
might be tailored to suit the malfunctioning transform (Tass,
2003). Treatments such as deep brain stimulation promise
to be more effective if they can be targeted to the specific
dysfunction in the signal transformation carried out by the
local malfunctioning circuit (Nenadic, 2008). Understanding the
local signal transformations executed by neuronal mechanisms
also allows tailored resection for therapeutic intervention in
refractory psychopathology; for example, instead of removing the
whole ACCs and ACCg, as has been done in the past (Graybiel
and Rauch, 2000; Sheth et al., 2012), focal resection of the ACCs
may be sufficient. Likewise, tailored deep brain stimulation could
be designed to boost the system out of a local basin of attraction
by injecting current at precise times. Understanding what signals
are transformed, how they are transformed, and where they are
transformed allows for both tailored interventions and bespoke
resections.
Other encoding processes in ACC provide insight into the
signal transformations relevant to disorders of social cognition.
Reference frame encoding and coordinate transformations are
fundamental computational functions for executing cognitive
functions (Pouget and Snyder, 2000; Andersen and Buneo,
2002; Cohen and Andersen, 2002). In reference frame encoding,
neural populations encode behaviorally relevant variables in
a reference frame, a coordinate system oriented along some
dimension, such as an egocentric dimension like eye position
or arm position, or an allocentric dimension, like the position
of the target in the world. Each neuron in a population
exhibits a preference for a specific value of the relevant variable,
and the population’s response encodes the variable’s value
(Glimcher and Sparks, 1992). In the sensorimotor transform
from sensation to action, signals encoded in one or more sensory
dimensions must be transformed via synaptic computations and
efferent signal transmission into the effector-appropriate motor
dimensions. This process of reference frame encoding, signal
transformation and transmission is a basic organizational feature
of information processing in the brain (Poggio, 1990). The
reference frame transformation mechanism is just one of the
types of computations implemented by neural circuit dynamics
to execute cognitive functions, and dysfunction in ACC in certain
disorders can be interpreted as disorders of reference frame
encoding.
Extending the reference frame concept to reward processing,
we propose that deficits of social cognition can result from
deficits in reward reference frame encoding. Reward reference
frames are different for different prefrontal areas, as revealed
by a recent study investigating reward encoding in rhesus
monkeys choosing whether or not to donate juice rewards to
other monkeys (Chang et al., 2013). In this study, reward was
delivered to the actor subject, to another non-actor subject
in the room with the actor, or to neither. Recordings from
OFC, ACCs, and ACCg revealed that OFC cells preferentially
encoded received rewards, ACCs cells preferentially encoded
foregone rewards, and ACCg neurons were mixed, with neurons
showing preference for received rewards, donated rewards,
and for both donated and received rewards, indicating a
mixed egocentric/allocentric reference frame encoding. This
mixed encoding is a hallmark of areas using intermediate level
transformations, those part way in transforming sensory signals
into motor ones, in the sensorimotor mapping necessary for
adaptive action (Pouget and Snyder, 2000; Chang, 2013).
The reference frame framework provides a number of new
hypotheses about the origin of social deficits in atypical cognition.
Social cognitive functions are a species of cognitive function
and, like other cognitive computational processes, are executed
using the basic computational building blocks of dynamic signal
transformations. The ACCg has been implicated in deficits
in following social gaze cues (Vecera and Rizzo, 2004, 2006),
a fundamental social capacity of primates (Shepherd, 2010),
and lesions in rhesus macaques have demonstrated that the
ACCg is central to social cognition (Rudebeck et al., 2006).
Mechanistic malfunction in executing social cognitive functions
such as occurs in autism may occur in the encoding reference
frame itself, such as problems in tuning or in the trajectory
traversed through the state space of the population (Amit,
1992). It may also occur in the coordinate transformations
necessary for adaptive social cognition, such as problems in the
intermediate layer’s implementation of functions necessary for
coordinate transformations (Chang, 2013). In any case, failures
of social competence may result from failures to implement
the appropriate processing, the reference frames, and coordinate
transformations requisite for social cognition.
CONCLUSION
As illustrated in the foregoing, neuropsychiatric evaluation
often focuses on deficits evident in particular tasks or on
characterization of anatomical insult (Damasio and Damasio,
1989). But research in cognitive neuroscience has unveiled two
levels, the model and the mechanism, and neuropsychiatric
illness can manifest as dysfunction at either of these levels. Model
dysfunction results from failures to execute the right information
processing model for adaptive behavior at a mechanism level,
and multiple such functions may be disrupted on a given task,
calling for care in the design and interpretation of behavioral
assays for mental illness. Mechanism dysfunction results from
failures to implement the right signal transformations at a
neurophysiological level, resulting in maladaptive behavior and
psychiatric illness. Models and mechanisms are tightly wound
together, as the execution of amodel requires the implementation
of the right mechanisms.
We have elsewhere urged scientists and clinicians to note
that neural circuits malfunction as a result of state-shifted or
variance-shifted processing (Chang et al., 2012). The addition
of noise into a circuit yields variance-shifted dysfunctions,
resulting in suboptimal and noisy processing, while shorting or
destroying a circuit yields state-shifted dysfunctions, resulting
in ablated or radically atypical behavior (Chang et al., 2012).
Applying this distinction in types of malfunction to models
and mechanisms, cognitive dysfunction could result from a
state-shifted or variance-shifted model or from a state-shifted
or variance-shifted mechanism. A state-shifted model is simply
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the execution of the wrong or incorrect model for a particular
behavior. A variance-shifted model is the execution of the correct
model, but with the model variables being encoded in a noisier-
than-typical fashion. Likewise, a state-shifted mechanism is one
whose dynamics are no longer qualitatively identical to those
prior to insult, and a variance-shifted mechanism is one whose
dynamics are qualitatively identical but with increased variability.
When considering this cognitive function space as a whole, each
disorder will carve out some dysfunction subspace.
While every executed model requires a suite of mechanisms,
models and mechanisms can fail independently. The failure of
a mechanism need not result in a failure to execute a model
due to redundancy. And just like death by a thousand cuts,
aggregation of variance-shifted mechanisms can result in a state-
shifted model. Furthermore, executing a computational model
requires the joint operation of multiple mechanisms. If this
joint operation is disrupted, such as by severing the connections
between mechanisms, then despite the preserved functioning
of the component mechanisms, the model may still fail to be
executed properly, whether ablated altogether (as in a state-
shifted dysfunction) or executed in a noisy fashion (variance-
shifted dysfunction).
Cognitive neuroscience increasingly invokes models
of information and signal processing to explain cognitive
phenomena. This neurocomputational approach to psychiatry
agrees well with other, recent proposals for understanding the
computational basis of psychiatric dysfunction, such as defining
new computational and cognitive phenotypes for classifying
individuals (Maia and Frank, 2011; Montague et al., 2012;
Robbins et al., 2012). By defining the dynamic space of cognitive
neural activity, classes of individuals may travel through
this space in distinct fashions that correspond to disorders
or symptoms, but that may also yield novel classifications
orthogonal to preexisting analyses of mental illness. We
urge practitioners to take note of this possibly revolutionary
transformation in the way that neuroscientists are explaining
neurocognitive function, as it provides a framework for the
analysis, interpretation and treatment of psychiatric dysfunction.
And as for Vladimir, who exhibited such maladaptive
behavior? His persistent rule following may have been the result
of an inability to properly follow directions, or of an inability
to properly assess the execution of a rule and transition to a
new behavior (Goldberg, 2001). Note, though, that he was not
completely incapable of following directions, only of executing
certain sorts of control over his behavior, such as preventing an
old instruction from informing current behavior or inhibiting an
action plan once initiated, redolent of the types of rule following
deficits observed on the WCST or of the sorts of compulsions
seen in OCD patients. Due to the extreme damage he suffered,
the absence of control structures based on foraging models,
dysfunctional reinforcement learning or belief updating, or other
types of damaged information processing may better account for
his dysfunctional behavior than appeals to classic, qualitatively
described functions such as rule following, rule assessment, or
rule transitions.
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